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From the perspective of the U.S. Department of Defense, Europe has been theworld’s “safe” region for several years. After the tumult and disorder that
plagued the Balkans in the 1990s, resulting in two major NATO-led military oper-
ations—in Bosnia and Kosovo, in 1995 and 1999, respectively—Europe has been
viewed as a peaceful, stable environment for American forces and interests. When
European Command is compared with Central Command, with its ongoing wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan, Europe unquestionably and justifiably appears safe and
happy; even the least-developed corners of Europe lack the endemic human secu-
rity issues that plague portions of Africa, Asia, and South America.
Even the Balkans, the countries of southeastern Europe that until the early
1990s were part of Yugoslavia and whose integration into European and Atlantic
economic and security relationships is incomplete, appear far more tranquil and
promising than just a few years ago. Political, economic, and social progress,
particularly in countries like Slovenia and Croatia, has been palpable and genu-
ine. Also, the keeping of the peace in Bosnia and Kosovo by NATO and European
Union (EU) forces, with hardly a shot fired during the stability phase, is no small
accomplishment, considering how hot the fires of interethnic hatred so recently
burned in those states. The early 2008 recognition of an independent Kosovo
and the announcement that Croatia and Albania will be admitted to NATO have
served as visible signs of progress in this troubled region.
However, beyond high-profile diplomacy, it remains unclear how much po-
litical and economic progress has actually been accomplished in the Balkans
under Western guidance since the mid-1990s. It is far from certain that trouble
spots like Bosnia and Kosovo have achieved much in terms of interethnic
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reconciliation or the rebuilding of civil society—to say nothing of securing
Western-oriented economic and political institutions—while Serbia, the region’s
key country, remains distressingly outside Western political, economic, and
security institutions. The Albanian question—a vexing political, social, and de-
mographic issue that increasingly affects the neighboring states of Macedonia,
Serbia, and Montenegro as well as Kosovo and Albania—remains out of bounds
yet is increasingly important to regional security.
Western, and U.S., accomplishments in the Balkans since the 1990s are genu-
ine and important, but has the mission been accomplished? While Americans
can be forgiven for paying less attention to the Balkans since 9/11, as the Long
War has caused U.S. military deployments in the region to dry up along with
economic aid and political focus, the costs of recent inattention are mounting
and may yet again lead to crisis in the region—something NATO and the United
States will be unable to ignore.
SUCCESS STORIES
The passing of communist Yugoslavia in mid-1991 was met with anticipation by
many of its peoples, glee by some and dread by others, but with a lack of interest
by most Europeans and Americans. While Marshal Josip Broz Tito’s Yugoslavia
got good press in the West, its heretic communist regime serving as a strategic
asset to NATO in the Cold War, it was less popular with many of its citizens.
Tito’s unique brand of communism, with its relatively liberal attitudes on social
matters, allowances for multiethnic expression, and quasi-market economy, was
popular with Western scholars as much as with governments. Yet Yugoslavia’s
secret police was as active as that in any Soviet-bloc state, its prisons filled with
dissidents. By the late 1980s, as the economy contracted and nationalism arose
again after decades of official restrictions, the federation created by Tito from
the ashes of Axis occupation in 1945 was no longer viewed as a happy home by
many Western-oriented Yugoslavs. It was therefore no surprise that Slovenia and
Croatia, the most westward-looking Yugoslav republics—geographically, politi-
cally, economically, and socially—were the first to depart Tito’s doomed state.
Both abandoned Yugoslavia by force in mid-1991, resulting in two wars: one
short and easy, and one long and painful.
Slovenia’s departure from Yugoslavia in the so-called Ten Day War beginning
in late June 1991 with hindsight seems to have ended before it really started.
There were barely sixty killed on both sides, and the conflict unfolded almost
anticlimactically before CNN cameras. Yet the ease with which tiny Slovenia’s
militia forces, equipped with little more than small arms, local knowledge, and
sheer grit, beat back the once-mighty Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was no ac-
cident; it was the result of months of careful preparation by Slovenia’s clever and
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thorough defense leadership.1 No less important was the fact that the JNA Gen-
eral Staff was deeply divided over how to react to Slovenia’s declaration of inde-
pendence and produced no coordinated military response to the crisis.
Although the JNA vastly outnumbered Slovene forces, especially in firepower
and mobility, paralysis at the top coupled with low morale among Yugoslav con-
scripts, who were unenthusiastic about fighting fellow Yugoslavs, unraveled JNA
efforts from the outset.2
If Slovenia won its independence from Yugoslav cheaply, however, Croatia’s
road out of Titoism would prove arduous and costly. The JNA, the servant of a
disappearing state, was willing to let Slovenia go, but Croatia was another mat-
ter; the officer corps, which was disproportionately Serbian, wanted to keep
Croatia in Yugoslavia by force, not least to protect the large Serbian minority in
Croatia.3 The result was a bitter conflict that cost thousands of lives and raged
into early 1992. The JNA’s grand offensive to subdue Croatia was an utter failure,
yet it did succeed in carving away a third of Croatia’s territory, mostly where eth-
nic Serbs were.4 This Belgrade-backed pseudostate, known officially as the Re-
public of Serbian Krajina, would last not four years. After the fighting died down
in early 1992, with the stalemated front patrolled by UN peacekeepers, the Cro-
atian government in Zagreb devoted serious effort and resources to creating
new, Western-style military forces. Croatia’s maneuver-oriented New Model
Army saw its debut in mid-1995, after long and effective preparation, in two of-
fensives, known as FLASH (May) and STORM (August). These operations to-
gether destroyed nearly all the Serbian-controlled regions of Croatia, at a
minimal cost in military casualties (though at a high cost in refugees, principally
the two hundred thousand Krajina Serbs who fled rather than live in independ-
ent Croatia).5 The struggle for independence, called the Homeland War by
Croats, ended in an unambiguous victory for the government of Franjo
Tudjman in Zagreb.
Given this recent history, as well as Slovenia’s more advanced economy and
closer ties to Austria and Italy, it is unsurprising that Slovenia has integrated into
Western institutions faster than Croatia or any other former Yugoslav republic.
It joined NATO and the European Union in the spring of 2004, and it became the
first postcommunist state to hold the presidency of the Council of the EU, for
the first half of 2008. Such political progress is perhaps remarkable, given that
Slovenia became an independent entity for the first time in 1991, but can be at-
tributed to its stolid, serious politics and avoidance of radicalism of any kind. It
certainly helps that Slovenia is essentially devoid of minorities (nearly all citi-
zens are ethnic Slovenes), and that there is no religious conflict either, since
Slovenes are nearly all Roman Catholics, at least nominally. Because there is no
real Slovene irredenta—the small Slovene minorities in Austria and Italy live
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peacefully—relations with Western neighbors are very good, and Austria and It-
aly have been strong supporters of Slovenia’s political and economic
Westernization since the collapse of Yugoslavia.
In economic terms, Slovenia’s progress has been real and impressive. Its per
capita gross domestic product (GDP) is very near the EU average, and Slovenia
is far and away the most economically vibrant and productive of the “new” (i.e.,
postcommunist) EU member accessions. In 2007, Slovenia was the first new EU
state to adopt the euro. While the economy has some structural challenges, prin-
cipally a high tax rate and low foreign direct investment, problems such as the
loss of manufacturing jobs to China and India demonstrate that Slovenia has
rapidly become a “normal” European country. It is important to note, however,
that Slovenia’s impressive economy is nothing new; under communism, it pos-
sessed by far the strongest economy in Yugoslavia, with a robust and diverse
manufacturing sector and a standard of living approaching Western levels. The
end of communism has merely enabled Slovenia to grow and integrate better a
functioning economy that was already impressive and decently integrated with
those of Austria, Italy, and Germany.
Recent changes to the Slovene military have been substantial. Since inde-
pendence, successive governments in Ljubljana have overseen the creation of a
wholly new defense system, centering on the transition from a territorial militia
to a mobile, professional force. Conscription has been abolished, and the Slo-
vene military is today a small (nine-thousand-strong) army, with modest air and
naval support, capable of battalion-sized deployments out of the NATO area.
Peacekeeping missions have included Bosnia and Kosovo, with small contin-
gents elsewhere, including Afghanistan.6 Despite resource constraints, Slovenia’s
military has integrated successfully into NATO and is the most Westernized of
all militaries in the former Yugoslavia.
Considering the undoubted success of Slovenia since 1991, in political, eco-
nomic, and social terms, it is paradoxical that there remains considerable affec-
tion, even nostalgia, for Tito and his multinational state. Such views, derided as
“Yugonostalgia” by critics, have a hold in all parts of the former socialist federa-
tion but are particularly pronounced among the Slovenes, many of whom miss
belonging to a larger, more diverse state, one in which average citizens were
protected from the free market by pensions, limited working hours, and free
health care.7
There is less nostalgia for Tito (who was half Slovene and half Croat) in
neighboring Croatia, where bitter memories of communism are commonplace.
Croatia, with some justice, considered itself the most nationally oppressed of all
Yugoslav republics, and many Croats still denounce “Serbocommunism” with
passion. That said, Croatia’s hard-won independence from Titoism has proved
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less successful than Slovenia’s in political and economic terms, and its recently
announced admission into NATO and candidacy for EU membership mark not
the end of Croatia’s transition but a midway point.
In economic terms, Croatia is doing well for its region but not by EU stan-
dards. Its per capita GDP is only 60 percent of Slovenia’s, and inflation and un-
employment remain perennial concerns. Niche exports, especially shipbuilding,
are strong points—another holdover from the communist era—while tourism
has rebounded vibrantly from its virtual disappearance in the 1990s. Corrup-
tion is perhaps the biggest drag on the economy, infecting the contracting and
judiciary realms, and public-sector reform is stagnant, as it is across much of the
Balkans. The fall of communism brought little in the way of “good govern-
ment”; indeed, corruption in the
1990s, during the presidency of
Franjo Tudjman, was possibly
worse than under Tito. Much re-
mains to be done.8
Croatia is a functioning de-
mocracy, and it has shed the outward vestiges of the Tito era, but its political cul-
ture maintains holdovers in mentality and personnel from the communist era.
The lack of lustration (i.e., decommunization) remains a sore point, including
for the police and security services, while public cynicism about the political
process is widespread and voter turnout generally low. Although President Stipe
Mesi, in office since 2000, has spurred little of the controversy or enmity that
were associated with his predecessor Franjo Tudjman, the “father” of independ-
ent Croatia and head of state until his death in 1999, neither has Mesi accom-
plished as much as many had hoped by way of political reform. In stark contrast
with Tudjman, who was a hard-line nationalist, Mesi has sought better relations
with Croatia’s neighbors and has attempted to heal the regional wounds of the
last decade, with some success; Zagreb since 2000 has taken a much more concil-
iatory and productive line vis-à-vis Bosnia, for instance.9
Many pitfalls of the Tudjman era remain, however, not least the vexing
problem of war criminals. With great difficulty, the Mesi government has
handed over several high-ranking Croatian military officials to face charges
before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in The Hague. The greatest controversy surrounded the capture in
Spain in late 2005 of General Ante Gotovina, considered by many Croats
one of the leading heroes of the Homeland War. Gotovina had been on the
run for several years, facing secret indictments by the ICTY relating to Op-
eration STORM in 1995, and apparently had enjoyed quiet assistance from
Croatian military and security services. Yet it was understood that the
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Mesi government had acquiesced in—and likely assisted—Gotovina’s cap-
ture, causing a firestorm of controversy in Croatia and widespread hard
feelings among veterans.10
Nevertheless, defense reform has been a significant accomplishment of the
Mesi government. While Croatia’s military has some distance to go before it is
fully interoperable with NATO, since 2000 officers with controversial pasts have
been pensioned off and professionalism has replaced political cronyism as the
prime mover of careers. Through the 1990s, the Ministry of Defense, run by
Gojko Šušak, the most corrupt of all Tudjman’s ministers, was a hotbed of graft,
kickbacks, and outright theft; rooting this dysfunctional culture out of the Min-
istry of Defense has taken years, but progress is significant. All efforts have been
focused on NATO accession, and in 2008 Croatia suspended conscription. Un-
der plans known as “Force 2010,” total active personnel will fall to twenty thou-
sand. The ground forces, built around three maneuver brigades (one reserve),
will receive several new types of vehicles (armored and unarmored), tank mod-
ernization, and new artillery; the air force will procure a small squadron of mod-
ern, multirole fighters; and the navy, essentially a coastal defense force, will
receive several new corvettes and fast patrol craft.11
Croatia’s contribution to international peacekeeping has been modest to
date, the only noteworthy mission being Croatia’s 320-strong contribution to
the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Zagreb’s unwilling-
ness to commit troops abroad has as much to do with the domestic political
mood, which is suspicious of foreign adventures en principe, as with the un-
readiness of the armed forces to operate alongside NATO before Force 2010 is
fully implemented.
The Mesi government likewise deserves praise for its regional and coopera-
tive approach to security affairs. Zagreb since 2000 has consistently viewed its
national security as an international matter, and both the Defense Ministry and
the Interior Ministry (responsible for the police and counterterrorism) consider
close partnerships with other former Yugoslav republics indispensable in con-
fronting transnational threats. While few Croats pine for the lost Yugoslavia,
most understand that good relations are a sine qua non for regional security and
prosperity. Lacking any major conventional foes or significant internal security
threats—Croatia’s Serbs, more than a quarter of the population in 1991 and
considered a fifth column by many Croats, are less than 5 percent today, after
Operation STORM—Zagreb in recent years has emphasized unconventional
threats like terrorism, migration, and crime as its primary security concerns. For
several centuries Croatia, as part of the Habsburg empire, stood as the bulwark
of Christendom against the Ottoman Turks to the south and east, an image that
has not been forgotten, particularly in the post-9/11 world.
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BOSNIA: UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Croatia’s security concerns are disproportionately focused on Bosnia, its trou-
bled neighbor to the south. Formally the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina,
the country received its independence from Yugoslavia in April 1992 and was
immediately plunged into a bloody civil war that lasted until the fall of 1995. The
country has been under foreign—first NATO, now EU—occupation ever since.
The Bosnian disaster was the leading foreign-policy story of the last decade,
grabbing the attention of the world’s media and helping drive direct NATO mili-
tary intervention against the Bosnian Serbs in the summer of 1995, in Operation
DELIBERATE FORCE. Claims of “genocide” and “ethnic cleansing” in the summer
of 1992 caused a firestorm of controversy that never abated. With hindsight and
dispassion, it is evident that the international media, encouraged by the Bosnian
Muslim government in Sarajevo, significantly overstated war deaths and the ex-
tent of wanton crimes against civilians. In particular, the number of war dead,
estimated at 200,000 or even 250,000, allegedly mostly Muslim and civilian—a
significant number from a total Bosnian population of 4.3 million at the war’s
outbreak—was grossly overstated. Detailed analysis by Bosnian authorities and
the ICTY independently determined that the total figure for war dead was about
one hundred thousand on all sides: roughly 54 percent military and 46 percent
civilian, with 62 percent being Muslim, 23 percent Serb, and 5 percent Croat.12
That said, it cannot be disputed that prewar Bosnia, a relatively thriving
multicultural society, was destroyed by the 1992–95 conflict. Before the war
Bosnia was almost 44 percent Muslim, 31 percent Serbian (Orthodox Chris-
tian), 17 percent Croat (Roman Catholic), and 5 percent Yugoslav (those, often
of mixed background, who refused to identify with a particular ethno-religious
group). All Bosnians are Slavs, divided by religion and history but speaking a
common language, once known as Serbo-Croatian and today as Serbian, Cro-
atian, or Bosnian, depending on one’s preference (despite differences in orthog-
raphy and vocabulary, these are linguistically nearly identical).13 Although
postwar analysis reveals few changes in population mix (though Muslims, who
now prefer the term “Bosniaks,” constitute 40 percent of the population), the
country has just under four million citizens; many left as refugees in the
mid-1990s and have not returned. More significantly, regional demographics
within Bosnia are notably changed.
The American-backed Dayton Peace Accords of late 1995, which formally
ended the civil war, enshrined two substate entities, the Muslim-Croat Federation
and the Serbian Republic, each comprising about half the country. These enti-
ties, which represented the warring factions—the Muslims and Croats had been
allied against the Serbs since early 1994, under pressure from Washington—
were given substantial powers, which were supposed to be distinctly temporary.
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This division recognized the population shifts that occurred during the war, and
despite Dayton’s pledges to resettle refugees in their prewar homes and commu-
nities, more than a decade after the guns fell silent the strong majority of refu-
gees have not returned. As a result, most Muslims and Croats remain in the
Federation, while Serbs are largely confined to their Republika Srpska. For in-
stance, Sarajevo, the country’s capital and largest urban area, was a multicultural
city before 1992 but today has few Serbs, who are just 5 percent of Sarajevo’s
population, fallen from 38 percent prewar.14
In purely military terms, enforcing the Dayton Accords has been a resound-
ing success. While under foreign occupation, which has coincided with a drastic
drawdown in Bosnia’s military capacity, the country has seen no return to open
conflict, despite high levels of hostility among Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. Be-
ginning in late 1995 as the U.S.-led, corps-strong Intervention Force (IFOR),
which was renamed the Stabiliza-
tion Force (SFOR) a year later,
NATO peacekeeping was robust
and properly resourced, relative
to the size of the local population;
just as important, the warring fac-
tions were exhausted and uninterested in more combat. Over the next several
years, the force’s strength fell from three divisions (one U.S.) to two brigades. By
the time SFOR was closed out at the end of 2005, to be replaced by the smaller,
European-led EU Force (EUFOR, at a current strength of only 2,200), it was
clear that the military dimension of NATO-led nation (re)building was worthy
of praise. Hence the claim of the last SFOR commander, Major General James
Darden, U.S. Army: “If we could do it all over again, I don’t know how we could
do better.”15
However true such claims may be in strictly military terms, it is clear that the
political side of Dayton has been markedly less successful. In the first place, the
political reintegration of Bosnia is far from complete. The two entities still exist,
and the Republika Srpska, in particular, remains jealous of its prerogatives and
unwilling to relinquish power to the ostensible national government in Sarajevo.
Dayton has not changed the basic political fact, which to a considerable extent
lay behind the civil war, that Bosnia’s Serbs do not wish to live in a unitary
Bosnian state politically dominated by Muslims, the largest group in the country.
For their part, most Muslims cannot envision a Bosnia that is not in some way a
unitary state, while Croats are increasingly resentful of their perceived
second-class status vis-à-vis the Muslims in the Federation. Bosnian Croat sup-
port for enhanced status under Dayton, the so-called Third Entity movement,
continues to exist, even though this is a taboo subject as far as Bosnia’s Western
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masters are concerned. Many sore points remain, above all the issue of war crim-
inals. While many Bosnians, heavily but not exclusively Serbs, have been extra-
dited to stand trial in The Hague on war crimes charges, some of the biggest fish
remain at large. The July 2008 move by the new Serbian government to capture
and extradite Radovan Karadi, the civil leader of the wartime Republika
Srpska, appears to be a positive development, yet there is no guarantee that his
upcoming trial will not devolve into a disappointing spectacle like many
high-profile trials at the ICTY. Moreover, General Ratko Mladi, the Republika
Srpska’s wartime warrior-in-chief, a revered figure to many Serbs, remains at
large as of this writing, his whereabouts officially unknown. It is far from clear
whether the ICTY model has worked well for Bosnia—some have suggested that
a South African–style “truth and reconciliation” model might be more politi-
cally healing and empowering for Bosnians—and it is incomprehensible to
many Bosnians that after more than a dozen years NATO has been unable to
track the most-wanted men down.
Since Dayton, Bosnia’s de facto ruler has been the high representative, se-
lected from EU member states. The high representative enjoys essentially colo-
nial powers, including the right to fire ministers and dissolve governments.
Despite, or perhaps because of, this situation, political reform in Bosnia has
lagged far behind where even pessimists expected it to be well over a decade after
Dayton. While recent years have seen belated progress in transferring authority
from the entities to the national government—including, significantly, the uni-
fication of entity militaries in 2005 (since 2006 Bosnia has had modest armed
forces recruited from Muslim, Serb, and Croat volunteers)—much work re-
mains to be done, and Bosnia today cannot plausibly be described as possessing
an effective unitary government.
Whatever the shortcomings of Bosnia’s political reconstruction since 1995,
its economic rebuilding has been even less impressive. The prewar economy,
which included a strong industrial sector, has not reemerged, despite ample
Western aid and direct investment. Much of Tito-era production was military,
which was neither needed nor wanted under Dayton. Just as serious, corruption
in all entities and at all levels of society is entrenched and so grave as to under-
mine any meaningful economic reform. How bad this institutionalized theft ac-
tually is became evident in 2000, when extensive investigation revealed that of
the five billion dollars in aid lavished on the country over the five years since
Dayton, one-fifth—a billion dollars—had simply disappeared. Worse, the cor-
ruption infects all the entities and political parties, and in real terms such back-
room deals have outpaced the country’s notional economy.16 While many
Western firms attempted to open plants in Bosnia after 1995, few remain,
daunted by the culture of theft and corruption that confronts all commercial
S C H I N D L E R 2 3
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activities. Even major international corporations have been unable to make
headway. After Dayton, the German auto giant Volkswagen AG attempted to re-
build at Vogoša, a Sarajevo suburb, a car plant that had been damaged during
the war. But the project was a bust, and after several years of trying VW pulled
out in frustration, having lined the pockets of local politicos but never getting a
functioning car factory going. Western investment was no solution to Bosnia’s
ills, concluded the VW director for the country: “No chance. You would lose
your money completely.”17
As a result, the unofficial unemployment rate is around 50 percent, and no
one seems to know the size of the grey economy or even how to determine where
it begins and the legitimate economy ends. The country has become, its leading
human rights activists conclude, “the last black hole in Europe.” Despite wide-
spread poverty, there is a wealthy class of Bosnians, usually connected to both
the political and criminal elites (who are not infrequently the same group), but
average citizens continue to be underemployed, to the detriment of societal
happiness and stability.
The painful truth is that since Dayton Western powers have done an inade-
quate job of forcing political and economic reform. Eschewing a fully colonial
approach as politically (and perhaps fiscally) unacceptable, NATO and the EU
have attempted to impose a pseudocolonial superstructure over Bosnian life,
with negative results. Corruption remains endemic, and Bosnians themselves
seem unwilling, or perhaps unable, to remedy the situation. The 2003 verdict of
David Harland, the former head of UN civil affairs in Bosnia, is just as true and
devastating five years on:
Eight years after a devastating war, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a remarkable success
story. Reconstruction is complete. Economic output has passed prewar levels and the
republic’s economy is now among the fastest-growing in Europe. Refugees have re-
turned to their homes, war-time nationalist leaders are dead or in jail. Measured by
the rate of marriage between young people of different ethnic groups, the hostility
that recently led to so much blood-letting between Croats, Muslims and Serbs is re-
ceding. There is palpable optimism in the air. What was recently one of the most
backward areas of Europe is moving forward.
The year is 1953.18
The Yugoslav communists did a far superior job rebuilding Bosnia politically,
economically, and socially than the West has managed fifty years later. Bosnia re-
covered faster under Tito’s leadership from the much more brutal and
devastating Second World War than it has under Western tutelage from the 1992–
95 civil war.
2 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Another major issue confronting post-Dayton Bosnia is Islamic radicalism.
Although Bosnia’s Muslims are hardly radical as a group, there exists among
them a small percentage of very radical sorts, many of them war veterans who
fought in al-Qa‘ida-linked mujahidin units. Such radicals hardly existed before
the war but can be easily encountered today, thanks to lavish Saudi funding of
radical mosques and Islamic “charities” and to quiet support from the wartime
government in Sarajevo for extremist causes. While the number of foreign
mujahidin who fought on behalf of Sarajevo was not large, probably four or five
thousand in all, their political importance was of a high order, both for Bosnia
and for the international jihadist movement. While few Westerners have paid
sufficient attention, it is clear that in the 1990s Bosnia played a role in the growth
of al-Qa‘ida much as Afghanistan did in the 1980s; simply put, the Bin Laden or-
ganization metastasized from a South Asian regional problem into a global in-
surgency in the mid-1990s thanks in no small part to its successes in Bosnia.19
While NATO and the EU have persistently attempted to downplay the extent
of the radicalism problem in Bosnia post-Dayton, some Bosnian Muslims have
been less sanguine and more willing to point out that Saudi-style radical Islam,
which was essentially unknown before the war, now has a visible foothold in the
country.20 With the death in 2003 of Alija Izetbegovi, the Bosnian president
from 1990 to 2000, radical Islam lost its most important benefactor; contrary to
the secular and modern image granted him by the Western media, Izetbegovi
was in fact a lifelong advocate of extremist Islam. He was an early member of the
Young Muslims, a subversive group linked to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,
which was banned by Yugoslav authorities for its links to terrorism (during
communist rule, Izetbegovi was imprisoned twice for his illegal Islamic activ-
ism).21 Of greater concern today is the younger generation, hardened by war and
swayed by radical messages (and Saudi money). The classic case is Nezim
Halilovi, a young preacher in Sarajevo with a considerable following on
Bosnia’s radical fringe. An avowed propagandist for al-Qa‘ida and extremist Is-
lam, Halilovi boasts of his ties to mujahidin in many countries, and his Friday
sermons from Sarajevo’s King Fahd Islamic Center—built after Dayton with
funds from Riyadh, in the “Saudi shopping mall style” loathed by most Bosnian
Muslims—are disseminated across the country and beyond on the Internet.22
Another continuing controversy has been the issue of Bosnian passports
issued to foreign mujahidin during and after the civil war. It is clear that the
Izetbegovi government distributed several thousand Bosnian passports to for-
eign fighters and “aid workers” who fought on behalf of Islam; Osama Bin Laden
is reportedly one of the many holy warriors who received a Bosnian passport un-
der other-than-normal circumstances. (Subsequent investigation revealed that
within two months of the Dayton Peace Accords signing, 741 foreign mujahidin
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received Bosnian passports with assistance from the secret police, and 103 pass-
ports were granted on one day alone in late December 1995.) Sarajevo finally
moved to revoke several hundred passports obtained under questionable cir-
cumstances in early 2007, after years of Western pressure to get serious about the
problem. By that time, more than a decade had elapsed since the issue first arose
in international intelligence and law enforcement circles, and no one knew
where most of the mystery men were living. Some had already turned up dead in
Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq.23
The extremist problem in Bosnia resembles the country’s bigger, broader
challenges. Poorly understood by outsiders, some of whom actively deny the ex-
istence of a problem in the face of ample evidence, it is as much the product of
foreign meddling and Western neglect as of anything done by Bosnians. It is in-
separable from broader problems of corruption and criminality—and it shows
no signs of going away or fixing itself.
KOSOVO AND THE ALBANIAN QUESTION
The political, economic, and social problems confronting Kosovo today are as
grave as those plaguing Bosnia, perhaps more so. There can be no question that
Kosovo remains the most volatile region in the Balkans, and the possibility of vi-
olent confrontation remains real. The emergence of an independent Kosovo in
early 2008 represents not the end of the conflict over this contested land but pos-
sibly only the next round in a struggle that has plagued the Balkans for years, in-
deed generations.
The road to NATO intervention in Kosovo nearly a decade ago was long and
difficult. Rising tension between Serbs and Albanians constituted one of the ma-
jor causes of the collapse of Yugoslavia after Tito’s death in 1980; as communism
waned, nationalism reemerged with a vengeance in Kosovo among both Serbs
and Albanians, and the Communist Party was incapable of keeping a lid on the
problem as it had for decades.24 The Yugoslav military had to be called in to re-
store order with bayonets in Prishtina, the region’s capital, after serious riots in
1981, and by 1987 the JNA leadership was talking openly of a “rebellion” emerg-
ing in Kosovo that aimed at creating an Albanian republic free of Yugoslavia.25
The Serbian crackdown that followed, and would last over a decade, perma-
nently embittered Kosovo’s Albanian majority and convinced even moderate
and nonviolent Albanians that cooperation with the Serbian leadership in
Belgrade was fruitless.
Serious armed resistance to Serbian rule emerged in Kosovo only in 1996,
with the appearance of a shadowy group calling itself the Kosovo Liberation
Army; for the first time since the Second World War Albanians were taking up
arms against Serbian rule over Kosovo. This radical organization sought to
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provoke a wider war by attacking Serbian police and, especially, Albanian “col-
laborators.” Such attacks mounted through 1998, and by the end of that year
large parts of Kosovo were plagued with a bona fide insurgency.
Belgrade’s reaction was harsh, as expected, and in late March 1999 Serbian ex-
cesses against Albanian civilians provoked NATO military intervention, in the
shape of Operation ALLIED FORCE, a seventy-eight-day bombing campaign that
succeeded in forcing Serbian forces out of Kosovo. While it is now known that
the extent of Serbian crimes against Albanians was seriously overstated for pro-
paganda effect—contrary to claims of tens of thousands of noncombatant
deaths in Kosovo, the ICTY was never able to verify more than three thousand
Albanian civilians killed by Serbian security forces—the Serbs lost the propa-
ganda war, as in Bosnia, in the opening round and never recovered.26
NATO then inherited Kosovo, as it had Bosnia less than four years before. In
ethnic terms Kosovo is less complicated; the population postwar is over 90 per-
cent Albanian, with small minorities of Serbs, Gypsies, and Slavic Muslims. Nev-
ertheless, nation building in Kosovo is by any standard even less successful than
in Bosnia. The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) has done a respectable job of
keeping the peace at modest cost; its total strength has dropped from over fifty
thousand in 1999 to sixteen thousand in recent years, with a U.S. Army brigade
as a standing contingent (supplied by the National Guard since before 9/11).
Unlike in Bosnia, KFOR’s commanding general has always been a European.
Yet KFOR’s record has blemishes, and its mandate has been filled with irony.
Within months of KFOR’s arrival in the summer of 1999, on the heels of bomb-
ing and refugee displacement, it was obvious that NATO’s job had become the
protection of the remaining Serbs and other minorities from the victorious Al-
banians. Attacks on Serb civilians and religious buildings had been common-
place, culminating in orchestrated riots in March 2004 that were pronounced a
“failure” for KFOR by leading nongovernmental organizations. The most de-
tailed report of the Albanian uprising is damning: “On March 17, at least 33 riots
broke out in Kosovo over a 48-hour period, involving an estimated 51,000 pro-
testers. Nineteen people died during the violence. At least 550 homes and 27
Orthodox churches and monasteries were burned, and approximately 4,100
persons from minority communities were displaced from their homes.”27
The political progress delivered by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) since 1999 has been even less impressive than the military-security
dimension. As UN veterans have elaborated in detail, UNMIK has singularly
failed to bring about any sort of Western-style “civil society” in Kosovo. Alle-
giances remain anything but civic, rather ethnic, even tribal; few Albanians have
any interest in living alongside Serbs or Gypsies, whom they consider enemies
and traitors. Also, Western concepts of good governance and measures against
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corruption fly in the face of local norms so completely that they are simply un-
translatable without serious coercion, which NATO and the UN have never been
willing to apply.28
The result is a functionally mono-ethnic society that is run by the leaders of
the Kosovo Liberation Army, many of whom are deeply corrupt, boasting ties to
organized crime and little interested in reforming anything. Thanks in no small
part to this disturbing reality, Kosovo’s economy is very troubled. The legitimate
economy provides few jobs, and at least half the workforce is without employ-
ment. Kosovo was the poorest, least developed, and most fecund region of Yugo-
slavia, and these trends have continued after 1999. Per capita income is about
two thousand dollars a year, among the lowest in Europe and far below that of
Slovenia and Croatia, or even Bosnia. Demonstrating how deep corruption and
criminality run in Kosovo, Carla DelPonte, the longtime chief prosecutor for the
ICTY and no friend of the Serbs, has recently asserted that Albanian fighters in
1999 murdered three hundred Serb prisoners, harvested their organs, and sold
them on the international black market.29
In February 2008 Kosovo ended its strange legal status—for nearly a decade it
had been nominally a province of Serbia, while under NATO/UN occupation
and quasi-self-governing—by formally declaring independence. This was pre-
dictably met with howls from Serbia and its ally Russia, but the United States and
most EU members quickly recognized the republic’s new status, as did most of
Serbia’s neighbors. NATO and the UN abandoned their former policy of “stan-
dards before status” (by which Kosovo would have been held to Western norms
on human rights protection before independence was permitted); confronted
with something of a mission impossible, NATO and the UN now considered an
independent Kosovo unstoppable. To date, there is no indication that independ-
ence will ameliorate Kosovo’s grave political, economic, and social problems.
Ominously, the emergence of a new state in Europe has reopened the touchy
issue of border revisions in the Balkans, as well as the perennially vexing Alba-
nian question. While few in Albania proper seem to pine for reunion with
conationals in Kosovo (officially now “Kosova,” per Albanian usage) and the
government in Prishtina is careful never to utter anything about Greater Alba-
nia, the Slavs who live adjacent to ethnic Albanian territory are undoubtedly
worried. Memories are long in the Balkans, and no Slavs have forgotten that a
Greater Albania briefly existed, consisting of Albania plus Kosovo and a good
chunk of present-day Macedonia, as a satellite of fascist Italy during World War II.
Serbia has its own Albanian problem, even after the loss of Kosovo. In the
months after ALLIED FORCE, Albanian militias operating in the Preševo
Valley, adjacent to Kosovo, staged dozens of attacks on Serbian police and
military outposts. Styling itself as a local offshoot of Kosovo’s successful
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Liberation Army and reportedly recruiting among the Albanian population
concentrated in the valley, the Preševo guerrillas were a shadowy, small
force that nevertheless succeeded in scaring Belgrade badly before disap-
pearing.30
The situation in Macedonia was, and remains, much more serious. Although
this small, landlocked country of two million was fortunate enough to leave Yu-
goslavia in 1992 without bloodshed, the years since independence have been
roiled by the ethnic question, to the detriment of peace and prosperity. Con-
ceived by most citizens as a state by and for Slavic Macedonians (who are cultur-
ally and linguistically close to both the Serbs and Bulgarians), they are a young
nation, despite having lived in the region for more than a millennium and a half;
Slavic Macedonians were formally recognized as a distinct nation for the first
time only in 1945, by Tito’s regime.31 Yet Macedonia has a substantial Albanian
minority of about 25 percent—in best Balkan fashion, the Albanians assert they
are a third of the population, while Slavs counter that the real number is only
one-fifth—heavily concentrated in the country’s west and north, adjacent to
Kosovo.
The desire of ardent Albanian nationalists for union with Kosovo is hardly se-
cret, and it took tangible and violent form in late 2000 with the emergence in
Macedonia of an Albanian insurgent force, the National Liberation Army, which
promptly launched attacks on Macedonian security forces.32 Over the next sev-
eral months, the insurgents staged assaults in or near several towns, and in
mid-2001 fighting came close to the capital of Skopje. NATO intervention, in-
cluding the deployment of over four thousand peacekeepers on the border with
Kosovo, helped prevent the conflict from boiling over, but not before several
dozen deaths had occurred; few outside the region realize how close the Balkans
came to another war in 2001. Hard feelings remain on both sides, as do suspi-
cions in Skopje that Albanian extremists are plotting more violence. Given that
the Albanian question remains unresolved, at least in the minds of nationalist
activists, there can be no assurances that such a conflict cannot reoccur, nor can
anyone be certain that a wider war could be averted again.33
“SERBIA IS RISING”: TWENTY YEARS AFTER
Given the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the biggest loser of the Balkans
wars of the 1990s was Serbia, the largest Yugoslav republic and the one most re-
sponsible for the tumult of the previous decade. When Tito’s federation went
over the cliff in 1991, the Serbian government in Belgrade, led by Slobodan
Miloševi, enjoyed de facto control over Serbia, its once-autonomous regions of
Kosovo and Vojvodina, and the neighboring republic of Montenegro. Today the
country has lost nearly everything; Serbs have been expelled from Croatia and
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live under foreign occupation in Bosnia, while Serbia’s borders are reduced to
nearly what they were before the Balkan wars of 1912–13. Most painfully, the
Serbian heartland of Kosovo is now irredeemably gone. In a real sense, the
Greater Serbia project espoused by nationalists has resulted not in glory but
ruin; Serbia has cartographically regressed a century.
It has long been easy to place blame for all this at the feet of the late Slobodan
Miloševi, Serbia’s failed leader, who was extradited to The Hague in 2001 and
died in ICTY custody in 2006. Much demonized by the West, Miloševi has more
recently been a figure for unhappy Serbs to blame for their current predicament.
Miloševi remains an enigmatic character, and he has never inspired balanced
judgments, yet his passing offers Serbia an opportunity to reassess the recent
past. Although Serbs managed to depose Miloševi bloodlessly in October 2000,
they have yet to come to terms with the damage wrought on Serbia during his
years in power.34
Miloševi rose to prominence and power in the late 1980s by harnessing Ser-
bian national feelings, which were emerging from under the ice of decades-long
official proscription. Yet Miloševi was never a nationalist himself; indeed, he
seemed a colorless communist functionary from central casting, and he had lit-
tle feeling for Serbian views (or for Serbs, for that matter). Cashing in on the pa-
triotic slogan “Serbia is rising,” he assured average Serbs they would be able to
preserve their prerogatives as the largest nation in Yugoslavia. When Tito’s Yu-
goslavia fell apart in 1991, Miloševi helped fashion a new, downsized one, con-
sisting of Serbia and Montenegro; under various names, this union would last
until 2006, when Montenegro too wanted out.
Serbia under Miloševi suffered from chronic ills, including profound eco-
nomic collapse, the sinister blending of organized crime and state authority, de-
mographic crisis, and losing wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.35 While
Miloševi was culpable for some of these disasters, he created few of them alone,
and some of the most serious defects in Serbia’s economy and political culture
were holdovers from Titoism. Yet it can be judged that Miloševi did nothing to
improve such ailments. Certainly his cynical brand of divide et impera politics,
particularly his employment of the nationalist bacillus as needed, contributed to
Serbia’s problems long after he left the scene.
Serbia’s current challenge is to form a new, postwar political identity suited to
present-day realities, and there is no indication that this will happen quickly or
easily. This should not be surprising, given the nature of the shocks to the sys-
tem—political, economic, military, and social—that Serbia has absorbed in the
last two decades, yet is not encouraging either. Fundamentally, Serbia’s body
politic is divided between modernists who envision a European future, based on
a market economy, rule of law, and integration into such Western institutions as
3 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 61 [2008], No. 4, Art. 4
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss4/4
NATO and the EU, versus traditionalists who favor isolation from “Europe,” per-
haps in collaboration with a resurgent Russia and in explicit resistance to NATO,
the EU, and almost everything else perceived as Western.36 While the modernists
have an appealing product, at least to younger Serbs, the traditionalists are able
to fall back on ancient national themes, buttressed by hard feelings caused by re-
cent mishandling by NATO and the West. How near run a struggle this remains
has been laid bare by the spring 2008 parliamentary elections, which resulted in
over three months of wrangling and horse-trading to produce a weak coalition
government; in the winter of 2008, the modernist Boris Tadi required two
rounds of voting barely to defeat the hard-line nationalist Tomislav Nikoli for
the presidency (Tadi actually lost to Nikoli in round one, requiring a runoff
election). While time may be on the side of the modernists, as younger voters in-
creasingly desire a European future, it may take decades for pro-Western atti-
tudes to achieve political dominance over the bitter-enders, and it promises to
be a bumpy road.
Real reform in Serbia will require root-and-branch transformation of large
aspects of public life, especially the breaking up of mafia alliances with parties,
police, and politicians of all stripes. The assassination of Zoran Djindji, the
pro-Western and more or less reformist prime minister, in March 2003 by a team
of mafia-linked secret policemen resulted in a short-term direct assault on the
covert cadres that control much of Serbia’s economy and politics, but much
more effort is required to defeat the perverse system that originated under Tito
and thrived under Miloševi.37
While Serbia presently lacks the military power to harm its neighbors, it is be-
yond question that many Serbs, including numerous prominent politicians,
consider Serbia’s setbacks of recent years to be temporary and reversible; many
assess Kosovo’s “final status” as anything but final. While such views may not be
reality based, given Serbia’s staggering economic and demographic problems, to
say nothing of its inability to confront NATO in military terms, they are held
rather widely and have their origins in Serbs’ deepest-held myths about them-
selves. Softening them will take decades and much patience. To be fair to Serbs
who feel wronged by NATO and the West, it is far from self-evident why some
Balkan borders are considered sacrosanct while others are not. Efforts by the
Republika Srpska to renegotiate Dayton and perhaps leave Bosnia in the after-
math of Kosovo independence were rudely dismissed by the Western powers,
but if Serbia’s borders can be redrawn by international fiat, why cannot the same
be done with Bosnian frontiers? In Kosovo and elsewhere, redrawing state
boundaries to align with ethnic realities on the ground, while temporarily
painful, will undoubtedly solve problems in the long run.
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Bringing meaningful and enduring stability to Europe’s troubled southeast
will require Serbia’s involvement and participation politically, economically,
and militarily. There can be no lasting tranquility in the Balkans without the in-
volvement—not just acquiescence—of the region’s largest and most populous
state. While Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro
cannot be held hostage to Serbia’s weakened political culture, neither can Ser-
bia’s neighbors proceed very far down the road to peace and prosperity without
Belgrade’s active participation. Serbia’s twentieth century, which began trium-
phantly with the Balkan wars and the creation of Yugoslavia on Serbia’s terms af-
ter World War I, ended catastrophically, in defeat and despair. It can only be
hoped that for Serbia, and for all the states of the former Yugoslavia, the current
century, while beginning in difficulties, will end more happily.
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